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"When I look back on the five years behind us, I cannot help but say : this has not been the work of man alone. Had Providence not guided us, I surely would often have been unable to follow these dizzying paths."- Hitler, June 27, 1937

"I, too, am religious; that is, religious deep inside, and I believe that Providence weighs us human beings, and that he who is unable to pass the test of Providence but is destroyed by it has not been destined for greater things."- Hitler, November 8, 1943

Hitler drowned out his own doubts by claiming absolute infallibility. He deemed his judgment irreproachable, not only in respect to the present and the future (he had “provided for every eventuality from the start”), but also in view of the past. In his speeches, Hitler was always able to find or manufacture some mysterious reason explaining that even glaringly inaccurate prognoses and false decisions had in retrospect been right after all.

Just as Hitler categorically refused to admit a mistake or assume the slightest responsibility for any errors on his part, he made no attempt to understand the catastrophe of 1918 in terms of the imperial government’s own policies or as a result of poor judgment with regard to Germany’s military and economic potential; moreover, he simply chose to disregard the enemy’s overwhelming numerical superiority. Instead, he believed the reasons for the defeat lay in betrayal and in the doings of secret forces, among them the Jews and the Freemasons. Hitler became a zealous advocate of the Dolchstosslegende (the “legend of the stab in the back”), and vowed to become a politician so that he might fi nally wreak revenge upon the Social Democrats and the Marxists.

"We perceive in this historical evidence of Teutonism theunconscious mandate vested in us by fate: to unite this stubbornGerman Volk, if necessary by force. is was historicallyjust as necessary then as it is today."- Hitler, January 25, 1936

Hitler would never assume this highly touted responsibility to the German people but would abruptly take his leave by pressing a trigger when the sum of his foreign policies and military operations proved a grave miscalculation. The suffering of the German people interested him only insofar as he was able to turn it to a profit at home or abroad. When he himself had caused the hardships, they were declared an unavoidable sacrifice that had to be made for the glory of Germany.

"My ambition is aimed at creating the best possible institutions for training our Volk. It is my will that we in Germany have the greatest stadiums; that our road network be expanded; that our culture become elevated and refined. I want our cities to become beautiful. I want to put Germany at the top in every field of human cultural life and cultural aspiration. That is my ambition !"- Hitler, March 1, 1936

One is occasionally confronted with the opinion that Hitler’s rule was basically a good thing - he had only gone too far in persecuting the Jews and starting the war. This viewpoint does little justice to reality, however, for both actions against the Jews and the outbreak of the war were no more than the end sum of Hitler’s politics and particularly the logical consequences of his foreign policy. Moreover, the final form each of these aspects took did not match Hitler’s original plans, or at least he had envisioned a different chronology of events.

Anti-Judaism had existed in Germany for centuries - at times open, at times latent - serving always as tinder when the fl ames of revolution and war swept the country, and oft en erupting into pogroms and other similar forms of persecution. However, these were phenomena not peculiar to Germany alone but in evidence to greater and lesser degrees in many other European countries. One of the more obvious causes for such hostility lay in the fact that many - and naturally above all the orthodox - Jews were, in terms of daily life, a group apart, easily isolated as the alien and incomprehensible “other” due to a different physiognomy, distinctive dress, and a foreign cultural heritage characterized by traditions and habits in contrast to their environment.

In wartime a person need only have an outer appearance differing from that of the normal citizen to be suspected, with no further substantiation, of being a spy and a traitor or to to fall prey to the lynch law of an aroused mob in search of a scapegoat. In both world wars, countless members of almost all of the European peoples were arrested, persecuted and even killed as spies, traitors, enemy collaborators, etc. - although they were completely innocent, and had aroused suspicion only by their appearance. Te two Christian churches in Germany had made it a practice of branding Jews as the in devils who had nailed Christ to the cross. The devil was depicted in Christian publications more often than not exhibited Jewish facial features.

One of the few professions open to the Jews from the very beginning was that of banking. Jews were more generous in granting credit than the other banking institutions, often providing funds to customers who had long been declared unworthy of credit. Yet, when Jewish bankers demanded repayment plus interest and initiated the standard enforcement measures, they were rewarded with ill repute and decried as profiteers and sharks.

When the Jews were nally granted admission to academic professions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, German lawyers, physicians, journalists, etc. were suddenly confronted with the competition of large numbers of Jewish colleagues. As long as the economy remained intact, this did not present a problem. However, when the crises of the 1920s and 1930s hit, the cry arose in academic circles that the Jews should be ousted or their numbers in these fields limited to their percentage in the population as a whole.

At the time National Socialism was beginning to take hold, it was widely held that the Jews were responsible for every mishap in Germany from the early Middle Ages to the twentieth century. By 1918 at the latest, anti-Judaism was playing an integral and open part in nationalist circles and parties throughout the country.

Neither Hirler nor any members of his family had ever had any unfavorable experiences with Jews. Hitler even wrote that, in his youth, he had been outraged by anti-Judaic remarks and got along well with his Jewish peers. This changed when he was first confronted with immigrants from Galicia with their curls and black kaftans : he regarded these Jews as alien creatures, and they aroused his aversion.

In Mein Kampf, Hitler conjured up an apocalyptic vision of the Jewish satanic world conspiracy : "If, with the aid of his Marxist creed, the Jew triumphs over the peoples of this world, then his coronation will be the dance of death for humanity, and this planet will once more drift through the ether devoid of human life, as it did millions of years ago. Eternal nature is relentless in avenging transgressions of her laws. Hence, I believe I am acting in accordance with the wishes of the Almighty Creator : by defending myself against the Jew, I am fighting for the work of the Lord."

Brüning held the opinion that Germany must “starve itself into shape,” but his deflationary measures served only to aggravate the situation. Hitler’s economic program was the exact opposite of Brüning’s. He categorically refused to consider the objections of orthodox economists to his measures, insisting that it was ridiculous to back up German currency with gold or foreign exchange funds :

"The salvation of our Volk is not a financial problem; it is exclusively a problem of utilizing and employing the available work force on the one hand and exploiting available soil and mineral resources on the other. The national community (Volksgemeinschaft) does not subsist on the fictitious value of money but on actual production, which gives money its value. This production is the primary cover for a currency, not a bank or a vault full of gold ! And when I increase this production, I am actually increasing the income of my fellow citizens; if I decrease production, I decrease income, regardless of what salaries are being paid out."- Hitler, January 30, 1937

In Hitler’s view, Germany had at its disposal sufficient workers, raw materials, and foodstuffs to solve its economic problems on its own. His slogan was, “German workers, begin !” (Deutsche Arbeiter, fanget an !). The millions of Germans unemployed at the time were suffering less from material need - particularly as unemployment aid preserved them from the worst - than from the fact that they did not know what to do with their time. A popular newspaper quip had it that the cry for work was louder than the groans of the slaves in ancient Rome.

Hitler had a remedy : he invited the unemployed to join his storm trooper formations. There they would find what they were lacking : something to do and an ideal for which they could fight. He elevated himself to be their savior, declaring that he had given them a new faith and a new hope, and allowed himself to be worshipped like a god by his storm troopers. Perceptive of the more primitive instincts of the masses, he generously accommodated the German people’s affinity for disciplined behavior, uniforms, decorations, parades, and military spectacles.

Not surprisingly, the number of Hitler’s supporters grew proportionately to economic need : on July 31, 1932, their forces amounted to 13 million Germans, i.e., approximately 37% of the voting public. Nearly the entire middle class, including most civil servants, cast their votes for Hitler, as did the peasants (except those who were staunch Catholics) and naturally the right-wing extremists, the former members of the volunteer forces (Freikorps), and the bulk of the retired officers. Of the workers, the only ones who voted for Hitler were those who wanted a radical change in the existing power structures at any cost and, depending upon the situation at the moment, supported either the Communists or the National Socialists.

In spite of all his oratorical efforts, Hitler did not succeed in swaying the organized Social Democratic workers to support his rise to power. Although his arguments were not completely unjustified, he was unable to make any headway with this group by claiming that the higher echelons of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the trade unions (i.e., the Bonzen -“fat cats”- as they were pejoratively referred to at the time) were taking little interest in the workers’ plight. The Social Democrats adherents countered with the equally not unwarranted argument that they had always been betrayed in the past and always would be in the future. They preferred “being betrayed by their own kind”, as a popular slogan put it.

The Communist methods impressed Hitler. He admired their conformity to one will, their obedience to a single command, and their readiness to fight their enemies in the streets if necessary. Bolshevism itself he dismissed as a primitive philosophy, perhaps just right for the Russians he so despised. Any further critical debate on its precepts he considered a waste of time.

Personally, Hitler believed that the “primitive” German Communists had neither sufficient force nor intelligence to stage a successful rebellion in the critical years between 1930 and 1932.

"Had Communism really intended nothing more than a certain purification by eliminating the rotten elements from among the ranks of our so-called upper ten thousand or our equally worthless Philistines, one could have sat back quietly and looked on for a while."- Hitler, September 14, 1936

“Put Hitler in power, and bad times will end !” Hitler had outlasted his reactionary opponents, but now he was called upon to demonstrate whether he could really provide the “work and bread” he had promised in dozens of speeches. And Hitler did prove that his economic theory was indeed the more effective, at least in the short term. Millions regained their means of existence. The farmers expressed their satisfaction with the new “ autarky program.” The workers were prospering, earning well and even receiving public acclaim for their efforts and being sent on vacations by the recreational organization Strength through Joy (Kra durch Freude). Hitler did demonstrate a certain talent for economic policy in the years following his takeover and this fact alone has earned him recognition from the German people and tolerance from the rest of the world.

In the minds of many Germans, Hitler among them, there was no doubt that the catastrophe of 1918 was a result not of any numerical or technical supremacy on the part of the Allies, but of treason in their own ranks. Hitler spoke of the “laurel wreath” which had been “craftily snatched from the German soldier in 1918” and became a spokesman for the unity theory :

The foreign policy concepts Hitler adopted in 1919 were inconsistent with reality with respect to both Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Moreover, they were his inevitable ruin : his view of history was distorted and he refused to correct it. He once claimed : "There is no excuse before history for an error; no excuse, for instance, to the effect that one explains afterwards : I didn’t notice that or I didn’t take it seriously."- Hitler, October 3, 1941

Hitler’s completely unrealistic fantasy of a possible Anglo-German alliance was void of any basis in fact or history. The alliances which had been established in the past - for instance, that between Great Britain and the House of Habsburg during the War of the Spanish Succession, or that between Britain and Prussia during the Seven Years’ War - had been formed not as the basis for a new German expansionist drive, but for the sole purpose of defeating France. The German dictator - as the majority of his countrymen - had no understanding of the British mentality, British history, or British statecraft. Hitler conceived of power purely as brute force. In contrast to his ideas, British statecraft propagated a healthy balance : in times of peace, it instilled in the populations of those countries dominated by Britain a sense of individual satisfaction, while during wartime it awakened the will to demonstrate undivided solidarity with the mother country.

As a consequence of World War I, Hitler harbored a strong feeling of hatred for France and viewed it as dependent upon Great Britain. Were Britain to become a German ally, France would be checkmated in any case. In Mein Kampf, Hitler mentioned the United States only seldom and in passing. He was nevertheless aware that the United States was closely allied with Britain and reasoned that, were he to win over the latter, he would simultaneously win over its closest ally. The converse sequence, i.e., that war with England would mean war with the United States, apparently did not occur to him. So great was his obsession with the idea of an Anglo-German alliance, that he strictly ruled out the possibility of war with Britain.

Hitler perceived himself as the great simplifier and once stated : “Our problems seemed complicated . . . But I simplified the problems and reduced them to the lowest common denominator.” Applied to his foreign policy, this meant that he simply projected concepts of domestic German policy onto international relations, believing to have thus cut the Gordian knot. The Soviets, for instance, he equated with the “primitive” German Communists, holding that they could be crushed with brute force. The British he placed in the same pot with the backward German Nationalists : once successful, they had now become incapable of rousing themselves to any firm stand. In Hitler’s ill-considered opinion, they were best brought into submission - or out of the way - by being either reminded of their common “Germanic-Anglo-Saxon” past and instilled with fear of the Bolshevist threat, or simply left to their own frivolous devices.

In light of these views, it is not surprising that Hitler could boldly state, “I do not doubt for a second that we will secure our vital rights outside the country in exactly the same way as we were able to lead it onwards within.” Even during the Second World War, he boasted, “I am firmly convinced that this [external] battle will end not a whit differently from the battle I once waged inside Germany !”

Hitler was puzzled over England’s manifest lack of interest in becoming a part of the Consolidation of Institutional Powers (Gleichschaltung) in Europe. Moreover, they surprisingly declined to accept his “generous offer” (grosszügiges Angebot) to protect the British Empire with his very own divisions. Addressing a visitor from Sweden in 1939, he demanded : “Herr Dahlerus, you know England so well, can you give me any reason for my perpetual failure to come to an agreement with her ?”

While Hitler’s consternation over such matters by no means moved him to reconsider his rigid preconceptions, Great Britain’s declaration of war on September 3, 1939, did jar him into speechless shock for several minutes, according to reports of the interpreter Paul Schmidt. Britain’s unexpected step struck a deathly blow to the very roots of his theories on foreign policy and, as such, would have prompted any normal-thinking statesman to step down immediately - at the very least. It had certainly not been Hitler’s intention to wage war with England. His primary interest lay merely in conducting a small-scale conquest of Poland. He was completely taken aback when Great Britain actually sounded the call to arms.

However, a few hours later he had regained his composure - and his hold on the view that an alliance with England continued to be a possibility. During the entire course of the war, he thus staunchly refused to take any vigorous action against Britain that might unnecessarily irritate his prospective future ally.

Hitler’s hope of overtaking the Soviet Union with a single sweep revealed itself to be a tragic fallacy. His concept of the primitive Russians who were most easily crushed by brute force - just like their supposed counterparts, the German Communists - proved a glaring underestimation.

Hitler’s irrational preconceptions on foreign policy had been proven false across the board, from the alleged Jewish world government and the potential for an alliance with Great Britain and Italy, to his plans for easy conquest and annihilation of the Soviet Union. However, he refused to acknowledge defeat until the foreign enemies he himself had made had occupied nearly his entire Reich and were literally knocking at the door of the Reich Chancellery.

To the Germans who attempted to warn Hitler of the unavoidable consequences of his fateful foreign policy, he pointed out that he had attained his domestic goals despite all predictions and warnings to the contrary and would thus similarly prove right with his ideas on this external struggle, a mere counterpart to his domestic triumph. Speaking publicly in 1937, he had declared :

"I have no desire to concern myself with those who know only the one well-worn objection to all major decisions : “It won’t work”. I do not need to assure you that a man who has succeeded in rising from an unknown soldier of the World War to be the leader of the nation will also succeed in solving any problems to come. May no man doubt my determination to put my plans once conceived into action, no matter how."- Hitler, February 20, 1937

By 1938–1939 and, at the latest, with the occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia, it had become apparent even to the uninitiated where Hitler’s course was headed. Nevertheless, it was already too late for any legal action; his position within Germany had become unassailable. With an ever-increasing tempo, Hitler raced onward toward destruction and ruin.

Hitler’s attempts to repeat the oratorical triumphs he had scored within Germany in the scope of his foreign policy and to impress foreign statesmen by impassioned delivery and radio speeches were completely inefectual when parried by representatives of comparable or superior nations. Hitler’s oratorical art made as little impact on Chamberlain, Churchill, Halifax, and Henderson as on Roosevelt. The wild threats with which Hitler intended to force the British into submission during World War II had the opposite effect. Churchill declared as early as November 1939 :

The BBC adopted the practice of broadcasting segments of Hitler’s speeches and contrasting his allegations with the true facts. The difference was a fatal one for Hitler. He had attempted to measure the world in terms of domestic German standards, and this basic miscalculation ultimately brought about his ruin.